Δευτέρα 14 Ιουλίου 2008

Ο ορίζοντας γεγονότων του Engels από τη μελανή οπή του Σλαβισμού.

Δεν έχω καμία διάθεση να κρύψω τη συμπάθειά μου και την ιδεολογική μου συνάφεια με το Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας (ΚΚΕ). Παρόλο που δεν εντάχθηκα ποτέ σε κανένα επίσημο ή ανεπίσημο όργανο του ΚΚΕ (ή της νεολαίας αρκετά παλαιότερα), για λόγους οι οποίοι σχετίζονται με την προσωπική μου οπτική, αναφορικά με τη λειτουργική, οργανωτική του δομή και πρακτική αλλά ίσως και λόγω κάποιων ιστορικών ατοπημάτων τα οποία ακόμα και πριν αρκετά χρόνια, δεν είχε το σθένος να τα αποδεχθεί ως τέτοια, θεωρώ ότι οι θέσεις του (σε πολλά ζητήματα αλλά όχι όλα) αποτελούν ίσως τις πιο ενθαρρυντικές και μοναδικές κοινοβουλευτικές πατριωτικές φωνές σήμερα στην Ελλάδα.

Σαν Έλληνας πολίτης (και όχι μόνο σαν επιστήμονας) δεν είναι λογικό να μείνω απαθής σε αυτό που διαδραματίζεται τα τελευταία χρόνια στη χώρα μας (και στην πλάτη της βεβαίως) αναφορικά με την εκτρωματική ιστορική δομή, που οι καπιταλιστικοί μηχανισμοί θέλουν ανηλεώς να δημιουργήσουν για προφανείς λόγους, των Σλάβων της ΠΓΔΜ. Εκτός από την εθνικιστική υστερία (και συγγνώμη για την έκφραση, αλλά πολλές φορές γελοιότητα) των πολιτικών ακροδεξιών παραγόντων της γείτονας χώρας (όπως είχε αναφέρει ο ίδιος ο Denko Malevski πρώην Υπ. Εξ. της ΠΓΔΜ), υπάρχουν και στην Ελλάδα διάφορες «φωνές» που αλυχτούν ενάντια στο ΚΚΕ και το ρόλο του στο θέμα του κρατιδίου, γενικεύοντας (και αυτό είναι το χειρότερο κατά την άποψή μου) την επίθεσή τους συνολικά στο κομμουνιστικό κίνημα σήμερα. Πρέπει να ομολογήσω ότι στο συγκεκριμένο θέμα το ΚΚΕ έκανε παλαιότερα τραγικά λάθη, τα οποία τα έχει αποδεχτεί. Επιπλέον κομματικά αριστερά εκτρώματα, που έχουν αναγορεύσει την αριστερή ιδεολογία σε life style συκοφαντώντας την ανεπανόρθωτα με τις θέσεις τους όχι απλά επαναλαμβάνει τα ίδια λάθη αλλά κάποιος φτάνει σε σημείο να αντιμετωπίζει με ιδιαίτερη καχυποψία (στην καλύτερη των περιπτώσεων) το «ιδεολογικό» του κίνητρο.

Προφανώς δεν έχει κανένα απολύτως νόημα, κάποιος να ασχοληθεί περισσότερο με τις αποκλίνουσες, ιδεολογικά, αριστερές δομές life style και τις «θέσεις» τους αλλά έχει νόημα, θεωρώ, να δούμε με ποιον τρόπο οι θεωρητικοί Μαρξιστές, όπως ο Frederick Engels, αντιμετώπιζαν το ζήτημα των Σλάβων στην Ευρώπη του 19ου αιώνα. Από αυτή τη μελέτη ίσως βγουν κάποια συμπεράσματα για το τι μπορεί να σημαίνει κομμουνιστική ιδεολογία (σε αντίθεση με τον Σταλινικό ολοκληρωτισμό και επεκτατισμό), ποια η άποψη των Μαρξιστών για τον Σλαβισμό (σε αντίθεση με την Σταλινική λογική του διαμοιρασμού της μεταπολεμικής Ευρώπης σε συνεργασία με τον Τσώρτσιλ), τι μπορεί να εξαχθεί από τη εμπεριστατωμένη πολεμική του Frederick Engels στη «διακήρυξη» του Michael Bakunin για «αδελφοσύνη» όλων των Σλαβικών φύλων (θυμίζει κάτι άραγε στη σημερινή Ελλάδα) και πολλά άλλα. Ταυτόχρονα όμως είναι και μία πρώτη απάντηση στην αντικομμουνιστική υστερία πολλών σήμερα στη χώρα μας για το θέμα του ονόματος του κρατιδίου, κάτι που προφανώς θυμίζει όχι απλά κάποιους σαν τον κ. Nicola Gruevski αλλά θέτει σε σοβαρό κίνδυνο την αποτελεσματικότητα των θέσεών μας ως έθνος για την Ελληνικότητα της Μακεδονίας. Ο κομμουνισμός ως ιδεολογία και ως, επιστημονικό, οικονομικό και κοινωνικό σύστημα αντιπροσωπεύει αρχές και αξίες όπως η ισονομία και δικαιοσύνη αλλά δυστυχώς η Σταλινική μεθοδολογία, απαξίωσαν την σημασία του και είναι ευθύνη η πλήρης αποκατάστασή του.

Το παρακάτω άρθρο είναι του Frederick Engels, Democratic Pan-Slavism, Neue Rheinische Zeitung 222 (1849) 362-378 ως απάντησή του στο μανιφέστο του Δημοκρατικού «Πανσλαβισμού» που εξέφρασε ο Michael Bakunin το 1848. Εκτός από πολλά συμπεράσματα τα οποία μπορούν να εξαχθούν, υπάρχουν και ένα-δύο (απλοϊκά ίσως) δικά μου: αλήθεια τότε δεν υπήρχε «κυρίαρχο» σλαβικό έθνος όπου ονομαζόταν «Μακεδονία»? Ξαφνικά εμφανίστηκε μετά το 1870 (κατά επιταγή βέβαια Βούλγαρων εθνικιστών και ίσως κατευθυνόμενων από την «αδελφοσύνη» των λαών του Bakunin)? Πως και ο Engels για την ευρύτερη περιοχή μιλά για «Slavs, Wallachians, and Greeks» αλλά του ξέφυγαν οι «Μακεδόνες» του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου με τη «μακραίωνη ιστορία»? Υπάρχουν 1-2 σημεία στα οποία δεν συμπορεύομαι μαζί του, αναφορικά με την οικονομική του ανάλυση, αλλά η ουσία του άρθρου θεωρώ ότι είναι η παρουσίαση, εκτός των άλλων, του εθνικισμού των Σλαβικών λαών (όποιοι και αν ήταν αυτοί ιστορικά) ο οποίος δεν έκανε τίποτα άλλο από το να αναπτύσσεται, να στηρίζεται και να εκπροσωπείται ακόμα και κάτω από το προσωπείο των λεγόμενων «αντικαταπιεστών-αντιεξουσιαστών» και των υπέρμαχων της «αδελφοσύνης» των λαών του αναρχικού χώρου (και όχι μόνο τότε αλλά και σήμερα) με κύριο εκφραστή τον Bakunin, αγνοώντας βέβαια βασικά ιστορικά, πολιτισμικά, οικονομικά δεδομένα. Και προφανώς το άρθρο θέλει να επιβεβαιώσει αυτό που ήταν ανέκαθεν γνωστό (ακόμα και το 1849), τη χρήση της «αδελφοσύνης» από το κεφάλαιο για τη δημιουργία ελεύθερων διαδρόμων (π.χ. προς Μεσόγειο) για την ανώδυνη και άνευ όρων εκμετάλλευση των λαών προς όφελός του.

Είναι προφανές ότι τα έντονα κομμάτια και οι χρωματισμοί της γραμματοσειράς προέρχονται από προσωπική παρέμβαση στο κείμενο.



Frederick Engels, Democratic Pan-Slavism, Neue Rheinische Zeitung 222 (1849) 362-378

We have often enough pointed out that the romantic dreams which came into being after the revolutions of February and March, such as ardent fantasies about the universal fraternal union of people, a European federative republic, and eternal world peace, were basically nothing but screens hiding the immeasurable perplexity and inactivity of the leading spokesmen of that time. People did not see, or did not want to see, what had to be done to safeguard the revolution; they were unable or unwilling to carry out any really revolutionary measures; the narrow-mindedness of some and the counter-revolutionary intrigues of others resulted in the people getting only sentimental phrases instead of revolutionary deeds. The scoundrel Lamartine with his high-flown declarations was the classical hero of this epoch of betrayal of the people disguised by poetic floridity and rhetorical tinsel.
The peoples who have been through the revolution know how dearly they have had to pay because in their simplicity at the time they believed the loud talk and bombastic assurances. Instead of safeguards for the revolution - everywhere reactionary Chambers which undermined the revolution; instead of fulfillment of the promises given at the barricades - counter-revolution in Naples, Paris, Vienna, Berlin, the fall of Milan, and the war against Hungary; instead of the fraternal union of peoples - renewal of the Holy Alliance on the broadest basis under the patronage of England and Russia. And the very same persons who in April and May responded jubilantly to the high-flown phrases of the epoch, now only blush with shame at the thought of how at that time they allowed themselves to be deceived by idiots and rogues.
People have learned by bitter experience that the "European fraternal union of peoples" cannot be achieved by mere phrases and pious wishes, but only by profound revolutions and bloody struggles; they have learned that the question is not that of a fraternal union of all European peoples under a single republican flag, but of an alliance of the revolutionary peoples against the counter-revolutionary peoples, an alliance which comes into being not on paper, but only on the battlefield.
Throughout Western Europe these bitter but necessary experiences have completely discredited Lamartine's phrase-mongering. In the east, on the other hand, there are still sections, ostensibly democratic, revolutionary sections, which are not tired of echoing these phrases and sentimental ideas and preaching the gospel of the European fraternal union of peoples.
These actions - we leave out of account some ignorant German-speaking dreamers such as Herr A. Ruge, etc. - are the democratic pan-Slavists of the various Slav peoples. The programme of democratic pan-Slavism lies before us in the shape of a pamphlet: Aufruf an die Slaven. Von einem russischen Patrioten, Michael Bakunin, Mitgleid des Slavencongresses in Prag. Koethen, 1848. Bakunin is our friend. That will not deter us from criticizing his pamphlet. Hear how Bakunin at the very beginning of his Appeal adheres to the illusions of last March and April:

"The very first sign of life of the revolution was a cry of hate against the old [policy of] oppression, a cry of sympathy and love for all oppressed nationalities. The peoples... felt at last the disgrace with which the old diplomacy had burdened mankind, and they realized that the well-being of the nations will never be ensured as long as there is a single nation anywhere in Europe living under oppression.... Away with the oppressors! was the unanimous cry; all hail to the oppressed, the Poles, the Italians and all of the others! No more wars of conquest, but only the one last war fought out to the end, the good fight of the revolution for the final liberation of all peoples! Down with the artificial barriers which have been forcibly erected by congresses of despots [meaning Vienna Congresses of 1814-15] in accordance with so-called historical, geographical, commercial and strategical necessities! There should be no other frontiers than those natural boundaries drawn in accordance with justice and democracy and established by the sovereign will of the peoples themselves on the basis of their national characteristics (βέβαια ο Bakunin δεν αναφέρει τι σημαίνει εθνικό χαρακτηριστικό αφού μάλλον αγνοεί την έννοιά του!). Such is the call issued by all the people." pp. 6, 7.

In this passage we already find reproduced all the rapturous enthusiasm of the first months after the revolution. There is not a word about the actually existing obstacles to such a universal liberation, or about the very diverse political needs of the individual peoples. The word "freedom" replaces all that. There is not one word about the actual state of things, or, insofar as it does receive attention, it is described as absolutely reprehensible, arbitrarily established by "congresses of despots" and "diplomats". To this bad reality is counterposed the alleged will of the people with its categorical imperative, with the absolute demand simply for "freedom".
We have seen who proved to be the stronger. The alleged will of the people was so disgracefully deceived precisely because it trusted in such fantastic abstraction from the conditions actually prevailing.

"By its plenipotentiary power the revolution declared the despotic states dissolved; dissolved the Prussian state... Austria... the Turkish Empire... and, finally, the last hope of the despots... the Russian Empire... and as the final goal of all - the universal federation of the European republics." p. 8.

As a matter of fact, here in the West it must strike us as peculiar that after all of these beautiful plans have come to grief at the first attempt to fulfill them they can still be regarded as something meritorious and great. Certainly, the unfortunate thing was precisely that although the revolution "by its own plenipotentiary power the revolution declared the despotic states dissolved", at the same time "by its own plenipotentiary power" it did not lift a finger to carry out its decree.
At that same time the Slav Congress was convened. The Slav Congress adopted completely the standpoint of these illusions. Listen to this:

"With a lively sense of the common ties of history (?) (το ερωτηματικό είναι του πρωτοτύπου από τον Engels, και είναι ενδιαφέρον νομίζω) and blood, we swore not to allow our fates to separate us again from one another. Pronouncing a curse on the policy of which we have so long been the victims, we ourselves asserted our right to complete independence and vowed that henceforth this should be common to all the Slave peoples. We recognized the independence of Bohemia and Moravia... we held out our fraternal hand to the German people, to democratic Germany. In the name of those of us who live in Hungary, we offered the Magyars, the furious enemies of our race... a fraternal alliance. Nor did we forget in our alliance for liberation those of our brothers who groan under the Turkish yoke. We solemnly condemned the treacherous policy which three times cut Poland into pieces.... All that we proclaimed, and together with the democrats of all peoples (?) (προφανής ο λόγος της αντίδρασής του! το ερωτηματικό είναι πάλι από το πρωτότυπο του άρθρου δηλαδή από τον Engels) we demanded freedom, equality and the brotherhood of all nations." p. 10.

Democratic pan-Slavism still puts forward these demands:

"At that time we felt confident of our cause... justice and humanity were wholly on our side, and nothing but illegality and barbarity on the side of our enemies. The ideas to which we devoted ourselves were no empty figments of a dream, they were the ideas of the sole true and necessary policy, the policy of revolution."

"Justice", "humanity", "freedom", "equality", "fraternity", "independence" - so far we have found nothing in the pan-Slavist manifesto but these more or less ethical categories, which sound very fine, it is true, but prove absolutely nothing in historical and political questions. "Justice", "humanity", "freedom", etc., may demand this or that a thousand times over; but if the thing is impossible it does not take place and in spite of everything remains an "empty figment of a dream". The pan-Slavists' illusions ought to have understood that all pious wishes and beautiful dreams are of no avail against the iron reality, and that their policy at any time was no more the "policy of revolution" than was that of the French Republic. Nevertheless, today, in January 1849, they still come to us with the same old phrases, in the content of which Western Europe has been disillusioned by the bloodiest counter-revolution!
Just a word about "universal fraternal union of peoples" and the drawing of "boundaries established by the sovereign will of the peoples themselves on the basis of their national characteristics". The United States and Mexico are two republics, in both of which the people is sovereign.
How did it happen that over Texas a war broke out between these two republics, which, according to the moral theory, ought to have been "fraternally united" and "federated", and that, owing to "geographical, commercial and strategical necessities", the "sovereign will" of the American people, supported by the bravery of the American volunteers, shifted the boundaries drawn by nature some hundreds of miles further south? And will Bakunin accuse the Americans of a "war of conquest", which, although it deals with a severe blow to his theory based on "justice and humanity", was nevertheless waged wholly and solely in the interest of civilization? Or is it perhaps unfortunate that splendid California has been taken away from the lazy Mexicans, who could not do anything with it? That the energetic Yankees by rapid exploitation of the California gold mines will increase the means of circulation, in a few years will concentrate a dense population and extensive trade at the most suitable places on the coast of the Pacific Ocean, create large cities, open up communications by steamship, construct a railway from New York to San Francisco, for the first time really open the Pacific Ocean to civilization, and for the third time in history give the world trade a new direction? The "independence" of a few Spanish Californians and Texans may suffer because of it, in someplaces "justice" and other moral principles may be violated; but what does that matter to such facts of world-historic significance?

We would point out, incidentally, that this theory of universal fraternal union of peoples, which calls indiscriminately for fraternal union regardless of the historical situation and the stage of social development of the individual peoples, was combated by the editors of the Neue Rheinische Zeitung already long before the revolution, and in fact in opposition to their best friends, the English and French democrats. Proof of this is to be found in the English, French and Belgian democratic newspapers of that period.
As far as pan-Slavism in particular is concerned, in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung No.194 we showed that, part from the well-meaning self-deceptions of the democratic pan-Slavists, it has in reality no other aim than to give the Austrian Slavs, who are split up and historically, literally, politically, commercially and industrially dependent on the Germans and Magyars, a basis of support, in Russia on the one hand, and on the other hand in the Austrian united monarchy, which is dominated by the Slav majority and dependent on Russia. We have shown how such little nations. which for centuries have been taken in tow by history against their will, must necessarily be counter-revolutionary, and that their whole position in the revolution in 1848 was actually counter-revolutionary. In view of the democratic pan-Slavist manifesto, which demands the independence of all Slavs without distinction, we must return to this matter.
Let us note first of all that there is much excuse for the political romanticism and sentimentality of the democrats at the Slav Congress. With the exception of the Poles - the Poles are not pan-Slavists for very obvious reasons - they all belong to peoples which are either, like the Southern Slavs, necessarily counter-revolutionary owning to the whole of their historical position, or, like the Russians, are still a long way from revolution and therefore, at least for the time being, are still counter-revolutionary. These sections, democratic owing to their education acquired abroad, seek to bring their democratic views into harmony with their national feeling, which is known to be very pronounced among the Slavs; and since the real world, the actual state of things in their country, affords no basis, or only a fictitious basis for such reconciliation, there remains for them nothing but the other-worldly "airy kingdom of dreams" [quoting Heinrich Heine] the realm of pious wishes, the policy of fantasy. How splendid it would be if the Croats, Pandours and Cossacks formed the vanguard of European democracy, if the ambassador of a republic of Siberia were to present his credentials in Paris! Certainly, such prospects would be very delightful; but, after all, even the most enthusiastic pan-Slavist will not demand that European democracy should wait for their realization - and at present it is precisely those nations from whom the manifesto specially demands independence that are the special enemies of democracy.
We repeat: apart from the Poles, the Russians, and at most the Turkish Slavs, no Slav people has a future, for the simple reason that all the other Slavs lack the primary historical, geographical, political and industrial conditions for independence and viability. (ακούγεται περίεργα ίσως!).
Peoples which have never had a history of their own, which from the time when they achieved the first, most elementary stage of civilization already came under foreign sway, or which were forced to attain the first stage of civilization only by means of a foreign yoke, are not viable and will never be able to achieve any kind of independence.
And that has been the fate of the Austrian Slavs. The Czechs, among whom we would include the Moravians and Slovaks, although they differ in respect of language and history, have never had a history of their own. Bohemia has been chained to Germany since the time of Charles the Great. The Czech nation freed itself momentarily and formed the Great-Moravian state, only immediately to come under subjugation again and for 500 years to be a bill thrown from one to another by Germany, Hungary and Poland. Following that, Bohemia and Moravia passed definitely to Germany and the Slovak regions remained with Hungary. And this historically absolutely non-existent "nation" puts forward claims to independence?
The same thing holds for the Southern Slavs proper. Where is the history of the Illyrian Solvenes, the Dalmatians, Croats and Shokazians? Since the 11th century they have lost the last semblance of political independence and have been partly under German, partly under Venetian, and partly under Magyar rule. And it is desired to put together a vigorous, independent, viable nation out of these tattered remnants? (βαριές κουβέντες αλλά ιστορικά αληθινές).
More than that. If the Austrian Slavs were a compact mass like the Poles, the Magyars and the Italians, if they were in a position to come together to form a state of 12-20 million people, then their claims would surely be more serious. But the position is just the opposite. The Germans and Magyars have pushed themselves in between them like a broad wedge to the farthest extremities of the Carpathians, almost to the Black Sea, and have separated the Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks from the Southern Slavs by a broad band 60-80 miles [German mile equals 4.7 English miles] wide. To the north of this band are 5.5 million Slavs, to the south 5.5 million Slavs, separated by a compact mass of 10-11 million Germans and Magyars, made allies by history and necessity.
But why should not the 5.5 million Czechs, Moravians and Slovaks form one state, and the 5.5 million Southern Slavs together with the Turkish Slavs form another state?
Take a look at any good linguistic map of the distribution of the Czechs and their neighbors akin to them in language. They have thrust themselves into Germany like a wedge but on both sides they have been eaten into and pressed back by the German element. One-third of Bohemia speaks German; for every 34 Czechs in Bohemia there are 17 Germans. Yet it is precisely the Czechs in Bohemia who are supposed to form the core of the intended Slav state; for the Moravians, too, are considerably interspersed with Germans, and the Slovaks with Germans and Magyars end furthermore completely demoralized in a national respect. And what a Slav state that would be, in which in the final analysis the German urban bourgeoisie would hold sway!
The same thing applies to the Southern Slavs. The Slovenes and Croats cut of Germany and Hungary from the Adriatic Sea; but Germany and Hungary cannot allow themselves to be cut off from the Adriatic Sea on account of "geographical and commercial necessities", (κάτι μου θυμίζει αυτό για το Αιγαίο) which, it is true, are no obstacle to Bakunin's fantasy, but which nevertheless do exist and are just as much a vital question for Germany and Hungary as, for example, the Baltic Sea coast from Danzig to Riga is for Poland. (πάλι κάτι θυμίζει αυτό; Αιγαίο μήπως;) And where it is a question of the existence, of the free development of all the resources of big nations, such sentimental considerations as concern for a few scattered Germans of Slavs will not decide anything! This apart from the fact that these Southern Slavs are likewise everywhere mingled with German, Magyar, and Italian elements, there here too a mere glance at a linguistic map shows the planned South-Slav state would be delivered into the hands of the Italian bourgeoisie of Trieste, Fiumeand Zara, and the German bourgeoisie of Agram, Laibach, Karlstadt, Semlin, Pancsova, and Weisskirchen!
But could not the Austrian Southern Slavs unite with the Serbs, Bosnians, Morlaks, and Bulgarians? (αλήθεια που είναι οι «Μακεδόνες απόγονοι του Μεγάλου Αλεξάνδρου? ) Certainly they could if, besides the difficulties mentioned above, there did not exist also the age-old hatred of the Austrian frontier dwellers for the Turkish Slavs on the other side of the Sava and Unna; but these people, who for centuries have considered one another as rascals and bandits, despite all their racial kinship hate one another infinitely more than do the Slavs and Magyars.
In point of fact, the position of the Germans and Magyars would be extremely pleasant if the Austrian Slavs were assisted to get their so-called rights! An independent Bohemian-Moravian state would be wedged between Silesia and Austria; Austria and Styria would be cut off by the "South-Slav republic" from their natural debouche [outlet] - the Adriatic Sea and the Mediterranean; and the eastern part of Germany would be torn to pieces like a loaf of bread that has been gnawed by rats! And all that by way of thanks for the Germans having given themselves the trouble of civilizing the stubborn Czechs and Slovenes, and introducing among them trade, industry, a tolerable degree of agriculture, and culture!
But it is precisely this yoke imposed on the Slavs under the pretext of civilization that is said to constitute one of the greatest crimes of the Germans and Magyars! Just listen to this:
"Rightly do you rage, rightly do you breathe vengeance against the damnable German policy, which has thought of nothing but your ruin, which has enslaved you for centuries...." p.5
"... The Magyars, the bitter enemies of our race, who number hardly four millions, have presumed to seek to impose their yoke on eight million Slavs...." p.9
"I know all that the Magyars have done to our Slav brothers, what crimes they have committed against our nationality, and how they have trampled underfoot our language and independence." p.30
What then are the great, dreadful crimes committed by the Germans and Magyars against the Slav nationality? We are not speaking here of the partition of Poland, which is not at issue here, we are speaking of the "centuries of injustice" supposed to have been inflicted on the Slavs.
In the north, the Germans have reconquered from the Slavs the formerly German and subsequently Slav region from the Elbe to the Warthe; a conquest which as determined by the "geographical and strategical necessities" resulting from the partition of the Carolingian kingdom. These Slavs areas have been fully Germanized; the thing has been done and cannot be undone, unless the pan-Slavists were to resurrect the lost Sorbian, Wendish, and Obodritian languages and impose them on the inhabitants of Leipzig, Berlin and Stettin. But up to now it has never been disputed that this conquest was to the advantage of civilization.
In the south, the Germans found the Slav races already split up. That had been seen to by the non-Slav Avars, who occupied the region later inhabited by the Magyars. The Germans exacted tribute from these Slavs and waged many wars against them. They fought also against the Avars and Magyars, from whom they took the whole territory from the Ems to the Leitha. Whereas they carried out Germanization here by force, the Germanization of the Slav territories proceeded much more on a peaceful basis, by immigration and by the influence of the more developed nation on the undeveloped. German industry, German trade, and German culture by themselves served to introduce the German language into the country. As far as "oppression" is concerned, the Slavs were not more oppressed by the Germans than the mass of the German population itself.
As regards the Magyars, there are certainly also a large number of Germans in Hungary, but the Magyars, although numbering "hardly four millions", have never had the occasion to complain of the "damnable German policy"! And if during eight centuries the "eight million Slavs" have had to suffer the yoke imposed on them by the four million Magyars, that alone sufficiently proves which was the more viable and vigorous, the many Slavs or the few Magyars!
But, of course, the greatest "crime" of the Germans and Magyars is that they prevented these 12 million Slavs from becoming Turkish! What would have become of these scattered small nationalities, which have played such a pitiful role in history, if the Magyars and Germans had not kept them together and led them against the armies of Mohammed and Suleiman, and if their so-called oppressors had not decided the outcome of the battles which were fought for the defense of these weak nationalities! The fate of the "12 million Slavs, Wallachians, and Greeks" who have been "trampled underfoot by 700,000 Osmans" (p.8), right up to the present day, does not that speak eloquently enough?
And finally, what a "crime" it is, what a "damnable policy" that at a time when, in Europe in general, big monarchies had become a "historical necessity", the Germans and Magyars untied all these small, stunted and impotent little nations into a single big state and thereby enabled them to take part in a historical development from which, left to themselves, they would have remained completely aloof! Of course, matters of this kind cannot be accomplished without many a tender national blossom being forcibly broken. But in history nothing is achieved without violence and implacable ruthlessness, and if Alexander, Caesar, and Napoleon had been capable of being moved by the same sort of appeal as that which pan-Slavism now makes on behalf of its ruined clients, what would have become of history! And are the Persians, Celts, and Christian Germans of less value than the Czechs, Ogulians, and Serezhans?
Now, however, as a result of the powerful progress of industry, trade and communications, political centralization has become a much more urgent need than it was then, in the 15th and 16th centuries. What still has to be centralized is being centralized. And now the pan-Slavists come forward and demand that we should "set free" these half-Germanized Slavs, and that we should abolish a centralization which is being forced on these Slavs by all their material interests!
In short, it turns out these "crimes" of the Germans and Magyars against the said Slavs are among the best and most praiseworthy deeds which our and the Magyar people can boast in their history. Moreover, as far as the Magyars are concerned, it should be specially pointed out here that, particularly since the revolution, they have acted too much submissively and weakly against the puffed-up Croats. It is notorious that Kossuth made all possible concessions to them, excepting only that their deputies were not allowed to speak the Croatian in the Diet. And thus submissiveness to a nation that is counter-revolutionary by nature is the only thing with which the Magyars can be reproached.

Ο Engels ουσιαστικά αποδεικνύεται προφητικός αλλά και αποκαλυπτικός σχετικά με την «ιστορική διαδρομή και μέλλον» των Σλάβων αλλά ταυτόχρονα απογυμνώνει τις «αγνές» προθέσεις «αριστερών σχηματισμών» στην Ελλάδα.

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